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Average profit of the bank
Elasticity
Gross return on investment
Investment size
Probability of success






Probability of receiving loan
Number of potential credit customers
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1 Relates to section IV only.I. INTRODUCTION
The development of financial markets in the emerging market economies of Eastern
Europe is considered one of the crucial elements of the overall reform process. Under central
planning, banks used to be passive recipients of orders from the planners; they did not engage
in any credit screening activity. At the same time, financial intermediaries have the potential
to assume an important role in the transformation process from plan to market. They could
gather information on enterprises, sort out profitable investment opportunities, finance these
projects, and monitor the appropriate utilization of the invested funds. However, an efficient
process of financial intermediation is currently being hampered by at least two factors. First,
the balance sheets of many banks are loaded with non-performing loans. The presence of
these loans exposes banks to a high risk of insolvency. Secondly, there is evidence that credit
markets are segmented due to informational asymmetries. In particular, new private enter-
prises seem to have difficulties in obtaining external finance.
The purpose of this paper is to present a framework which suits to analyze the effects
of these obstacles to an efficient process of financial intermediation. The major conclusions
can be summarized as follows. If banks have positive costs of insolvency, they will reduce
lending and raise interest rates as the share of non-performing loans on their balance sheets
increases. However, in the presence of incomplete information on borrowers, banks may
choose to ration credit rather than to adjust interest rates upwards. More specifically, asym-
metric information can give a rationale for private enterprises being credit rationed. Because
of the lack of collateral in private firms, which might serve as a sorting device, investment in-
to information by the banks should be given priority.
The paper starts by giving an overview over some stylized facts of Eastern European
financial markets (part two). In the third part, the financial liberalization literature is briefly
reviewed. After that, a microeconomic framework of the behavior of banks is presented. At
the end of the paper, the main findings are summarized.n. STYLIZED FACTS
This part summarizes empirical evidence on the behavior of real credit to enterprises,
credit availability to private enterprises, non-performing loans on the balance sheets of banks,
and real interest rates.
2 Former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were selected as repre-
sentative countries because of the body of experience they can provide as early reformers.
The analysis covers the time period from 1989 onwards.
1. Domestic Credit
Following the liberalization of prices and the introduction of monetary stabilization
programs, the stock of real credit dropped substantially in all three countries [Table I].
3
Between 1988 and 1992 real credit fell by 44 percent in Hungary
4 and by 40 percent in Po-
land. In former Czechoslovakia, the reduction of real credit balances amounted only to 15
percent. Apart from the different degree to which real credit balances were eroded, the de-
cline of credit displayed different patterns over time. In Poland, real credit fell by 9 percent in
1989 but the bulk of the adjustment took place in 1990 (-52 percent). Real credit rose in
1991 (+ 16 percent) and 1992 (+ 18 percent). In the first half of 1993, real domestic credit
stayed virtually constant. In Hungary, real credit developed in a rather different pattern. It
remained almost constant in 1989 but dropped throughout the entire period between 1990 and
1993 (mid-year) with the greatest contraction in 1991 (- 20 percent). In former Czechoslo-
vakia, the temporal pattern of change was, again, quite different. Here, real domestic credit
increased in 1989 by 11 percent, stayed virtually unchanged in 1990 and dropped by one
fourth in 1991 due to the liberalization of prices in this year. 1992 saw a slight recovery of
3 percent.
Other indicators, focusing on institutional and legislative aspects of the respective banking
systems, were described in Buch [1993a, b].
Nominal values were deflated by consumer price indices. For Hungary and Poland, this
overstates the true amount of credit contraction as between 1989 and 1992 consumer
prices rose faster than industrial producer prices. In former Czechoslovakia, the two price
indices moved in a rather parallel fashion [Estrin et al., 1993, pp. 27].







































































































*) nominal changes in percent per period. —
 a Data for 1993 covers only the Czech Republic. — ^
March-December 1990. —
 c CSFR: Credit to state-owned enterprises; Hungary: Credit to large firms;
Poland: Credit to state-owned enterprises and co-operatives. — ^ 1992 and 1993 = credit liabilities of
non-financial sector.
Source: IMF, NBH, NBP, PlanEcon, SBC; own calculations.
Essentially, the decline of real credit reflected a necessary reduction of a debt over-
hang which had been accumulated under central planning.
5 A contraction of money supply,
measured by the change in M2, cannot generally be held responsible for this decline. Only in
5 Bennett/Schadler [1992, p. 3] define such a debt overhang as the excess of the present
value of interest payments due on debt over the present value of prospective enterprise
profits and primary surpluses of the government.Poland did credit growth generally exceed that of the money stock. In Hungary, between
1990 and 1992, money supply expanded more rapidly than the volume of credit; in former
Czechoslovakia, this was the case in 1991 and 1992. A contraction of real credit after the ini-
tial price adjustments had taken place might therefore be the result of structural deficiencies
of the financial systems. In particular, uncertainty over the future of enterprises, a lack of in-
formation, and insufficient credit assessment skills of bankers may have caused a reluctance
to lend.
6 The different patterns of credit development over time may thus be the result of na-
tional policies which supported a risk-oriented lending behavior of banks.
As the uncertainty over the performance of new, private enterprises is in particular
large, access to bank credit may have been more difficult for these firms than for existing
enterprises [OECD, 1993, p. 16]. However, information on the credit that has been allocated
to new, private sector enterprises is scarce and mostly anecdotal. National statistics either do
not explicitly differentiate between private and state-owned enterprises or use non-uniform
definitions across countries. Moreover, data on credit to the private sector does not differen-
tiate between newly emerging private enterprises and privatized firms. Yet, privatized firms
because of their well established relations to banks should have easier access to credit than
new, private firms.
Based on survey data, Swan and Webster [1993] and Webster [1993a, b] show for
1991 that new, private enterprises faced in fact obstacles to obtaining bank finance in Poland
and Hungary. In former Czechoslovakia, in contrast, did private enterprises not seem to have
been credit rationed to a significant extent. Available statistical information on the respective
countries confirms this tendency. In former Czechoslovakia, credit to the private sector vir-
tually exploded during the 1990-1992-period while credit to the state sector almost stagnated
in 1989-1990 and rose in 1991-1992 by only 18 percent annually on average. As a result, the
share of private sector credit in total credit increased from virtually zero at the beginning of
reforms to 22 percent in 1992. In the Czech Republic, this tendency strengthened even fur-
ther, and the private sector held a share of two-thirds in total credit in September 1993.
7 In
Hungary, the share of private sector credit increased somewhat more modestly from 3.8 per-
cent in 1989 to 10.3 percent in 1992. In Poland, did the share of private enterprises in total
6 Another explanation for the decline of real credit is that credit ceilings may have
prohibited banks from lending more. However, while credit ceilings were not even
binding in former Czechoslovakia, Polish banks have obviously not followed the
guidelines set by their central bank [Schmieding/Buch, 1992].
7 This sharp increase is also a result of the progress that has been made with privatizing
state-owned firms because the first round of the voucher privatization program was
completed in 1993.bank credit rise from 5.4 percent in 1989 to 33.5 percent in 1991 and to 35.51 percent in
1992.
Generally, growth of credit to the private sector clearly exceeded growth of credit to
the state sector. However, comparing the private sector share in total credit to the share in
production and employment [Table 2], it is obvious that the share in credit underrates this
sector's contribution to the overall production in the Hungarian and the Polish economies.





















































a Upper value gives estimate of Hungarian Ministry of Finance, lower value estimate of United
Nations Economic Council for Europe. — & Including co-operatives. —
 c Estimate.
Source: Statistical Reports of National Banks, EBRD, IMF; own calculations.
2. Non-Performing Loans
A high share of non-performing loans on the balance sheets of Eastern European
banks may be one explanation for the reluctance of banks to lend out more funds. Again,
systematic evidence on the extent of non-performing loans on the balance sheets is not avai-
lable. The most comprehensive assessment of the size of the bad loan problem was made by
the OECD [1993]. According to this estimate, the amount of bad debt as a percentage of totalloans is highest in Poland (32 percent) and lowest in former Czechoslovakia (11-15 percent)
[Table 3]. Especially in Poland, where high inflation rates eroded the real value of loans from
the past, non-performing loans are primarily a result of unsound lending practices. In both
countries, the share of bad debt on the balance sheets of banks has grown substantially from
16 percent in 1991 and 2.6 percent in 1990, respectively. In Hungary, non-performing loans
increased sharply between 1991 and 1992 to from 7 to 38 percent of total bank credits. How-
ever, in March 1993, this ratio was down to 30 percent as a result of a debt consolidation
scheme, which will be described below. In both, former Czechoslovakia and Hungary, do the
low initial shares of non-performing loans probably misrepresent the true size of the problem.
Disclosure rules at that time did not force banks to assess and declare credit risk.
The three reform countries tried to solve the problem of non-performing loans by
various policy measures although none of the countries implemented a broad and encom-
passing program favored by many academics. Such a program would have consisted of a
write-off of loans, a recapitalization of banks with interest-bearing government bonds, and
the subsequent privatization of banks [Begg/Portes, 1992; Hinds, 1990; Schmieding/Buch,
1992].
8 Out of the three countries, former Czechoslovakia tackled the problem first and most
comprehensively by transferring non-performing loans to a newly established Consolidation
Bank. Covered by this program were so called Perpetual Inventory Credits which had under
central planning been granted at low interest rates. In exchange for these credits, banks were
recapitalized by government bonds. Enterprises were not relieved off their debt. Instead, the
Consolidation Bank tries to recoup the credits from the enterprises. Hungary at first tried to
let its banks grow out of the bad debt problem. Banks which were incurring large profits
should use these to write off non-performing loans. In March 1993, however, Hungary im-
plemented a debt consolidation scheme. According to this scheme, two-thirds of all non-per-
forming loans can be sold to a state-owned fund at a price of about 80 percent of the loans'
face value. The fund then manages the purchased loans. Banks are recapitalized, if necessary,
by government bonds. Hence, both former Czechoslovakia and Hungary rely on a more or
less centralized approach to solving the bad debt problem. Poland, in contrast, did nothing at
first to solve the issue. More recently, it implemented a decentralized, market-based solution.
According to the Law on the Restructuring of Banks and Enterprises, which became effective
in early 1993, state-owned banks have to establish a separate organizational unit. This unit is
supposed to deal with problem loans. It prepares debt consolidation schemes which, among
8 The situation of Eastern Germany can be viewed as an interesting benchmark case. Here,
the complete institutional infrastructure of West Germany was transferred, and the stock
problem of non-performing loans was solved at one stroke through guarantees of the West
German government. In addition, the government tries to spur credit allocation to the
private sector by giving credit guarantees for new credits [Wagner, 1993].others, might provide for the sale of bad loans on the market. Financial funds from interna-
tional organizations as well as from the Polish government have been made available with
which selected banks can be recapitalized [Schmieding/Buch, 1992].
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Source: OECD, 1993; Data from National Central Banks; own calculations.
3. Real Interest Rates
Low nominal interest rates were one major reason for the distortions of financial
flows under central planning. Interest rates were not used as prices for financial funds which
would have reflected the amount of risk of a loan. Accordingly, the liberalization of interest
rates was one major step towards a market-based financial system. In Hungary, this liberali-
zation of interest rates had already started in 1987 when interest rates on both, enterprise de-
posits and loans to enterprises, were freed. In 1989, interest rates on household deposits ma-
turing in more than three years were liberalized as well. However, only in January 1991, were
all official interest rate ceilings abolished. In Poland, the interest rate policies of commercial
banks were liberalized in January 1990, and the central bank started to set its refinancing rate
in accordance with expected inflation [Galbis, 1993]. In former Czechoslovakia, ceilings on
lending rates were set be the central bank during the first months of the reform program10
[Calvo/Coricelli, 1993, p. 96]. Since then, banks in former Czechoslovakia have not been
subjected to interest rates ceilings.
Despite these liberalization efforts, real lending rates were negative at the early stages
of financial reforms [Graph 1].9 In former Czechoslovakia, the average lending rate to enter-
prises stayed negative in real terms from mid-1990 to mid-1991 with an average of -16 per-
cent and -33 percent in the second half of 1990 and the first half of 1991, respectively. Af-
terwards, positive lending rates were achieved and reached an average of 7 percent in the
second half of 1991. In 1992, real interest rates declined to 5.3 percent on average, not taking
the low real interest rates at the end of the year into account. ^ Interestingly, in the Czech
Republic real interest rates for private sector credit were in 1992 about 2 percentage points
higher than average interest rates on credits to all enterprises. This can partially be explained
by higher risk premia that are being charged on private sector credits. In Hungary, real len-
ding rates for loans with maturities of less than one year remained positive throughout much
of the 1990-1993-period. Only in the first half of 1991 were lending rates negative with an
average of -12 percent. If this period is not taken into account, real lending rates averaged
about 11 percent throughout. For Poland, real interest rates have been calculated for the refi-
nancing rate for banks which is set by the central bank on the basis of expected inflation. Be-
cause future inflation was typically under-estimated, the real interest rate was negative in al-
most the entire period between 1990 and mid-1993 (-7 percent on average). However, the
variations of interest rates could be reduced substantially such that in late 1992 and early
1993 average real interest rates were only slightly negative and almost equal to zero. Only in
the second half of 1991 were real interest rates positive (10 percent). For many Polish firms,
however, actual real interest rates are much higher than the refinancing rate indicates. Nomi-
nal lending rates of Polish banks for credits with the lowest risk rate, for example, varied
between 35 and 55 percent in mid-1993, the lower bound given by the refinancing rate for
commercial banks.




 annual interest rate, n = monthly rate of inflation, all expressed in
proportional form. This formulation assumes that the current inflation rate is the best
predictor of future inflation.
1
0 For 1992, inflation rates from the Czech Republic were used. As annual inflation was
higher in the Czech than in the Slovak Republic, this tends to underestimate effective real
interest rates.11
Graph 1 — Real Interest Rates in Poland, Former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, 1990-1993.
(a) Poland: Refinancing rate of Central Bank*
*) Gives lower bound of lending rates of commercial banks.
(b) Former Czechoslovakia: Average lending rate to enterprises
(c) Hungary: Lending rate for loans under one year (all banks)
Source: National Banks, own calculations.12
In summary, the following stylized facts emerge:
— In all three countries did real credit contract. However, the extent and timing of these
contractions was different.
— Credit to the private sector grew more rapidly than credit to the state sector. Except for
the case of former Czechoslovakia, however, the share of private sector credit in total
credit underrates this sector's contribution to GDP.
— All three countries are having a substantial problem with non-performing loans.
— At the early stage of financial reform, real interest rates were negative. However, positive
and often high real lending rates were charged soon. Real lending rates were on average
lowest in former Czechoslovakia.
in. MODELS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
This chapter reviews models of financial liberalization. It starts by contrasting the
traditional neoclassical and neo-structuralist approaches which both fail to take account of
institutional features of financial markets such as adverse selection and moral hazard. After
that, an endogenous growth model with adverse selection is summarized.
1. Traditional Models
The classical case for financial liberalization was made in the early 1970s by
McKinnon and Shaw. They depart from a situation of financial repression in which interest
rates are suppressed below their optimal level in the hope that low interest rates would spur
investment and growth. Interest rates may even become negative in real terms. Often, interest
rate ceilings are combined with credit programs through which the government allocates
credit to targeted industries and with reserve requirements imposed on commercial banks that
serve as a tax on lending. In this sense, the financial system of a centrally planned economy
was a perfectly repressed system because credit allocation was completely centralized and
nominal interest rates were not adjusted to take account of inflation.
1
1
According to the neoclassical view of McKinnon and Shaw, financial liberalization
consisting of the abolition of centrally fixed interest rates, the introduction of a tight mone-
tary policy, and a lowering of reserve requirements will divert resources away from
1
1 For a detailed description of the financial system of socialist economies see Kornai
[1992].13
non-productive inflation hedges and inefficient self-finance. More funds are raised because
domestic savings are elicited through higher real interest rates. These higher savings are then
allocated to more efficient uses. Financial liberalization will also eliminate the scope for
rent-seeking activities that emerge from repressed financial systems. The implications of the
McKinnon/Shaw- model with inside money
1
2 are shown in graph 2.
1
3 As real interest rates
are fixed at F below the market-clearing interest rate r*, desired investments exceed desired
savings. Not every firm willing to pay the low interest rate can actually receive credit. Hence,
interest rate ceilings lead to disequilibrium credit rationing in the amount of A = 7-/o. Be-
cause of the capital market distortion, firms' access to fixed and working capital is restricted,
and production is suboptimal.
The interest rate ceiling distorts the economy in three different ways. First, future
consumption is discriminated against current consumption such that savings are suppressed
below their socially optimal level. Secondly, because of the low cost of capital, investors en-
gage in capital-intensive, low-yield projects. Thirdly, funds are channelled towards preferen-
tial sectors of the economy which are not necessarily the most profitable ones. An abolition
of the interest rates ceiling allows real interest rates to adjust to their market-clearing levels.
This higher real interest rate contributes to the elimination of the capital market distortions,
raises investment, and thus spurs economic growth. Because savings are a function of the
economy's growth rate (g), the supply of savings will shift as a result of higher real interest
rates. This stimulates investment even further. [Fry, 1987, pp. 6-7] Hence, by eliminating in-
terest rates ceilings, financial liberalization has positive effects on economic growth.
1
2 Inside money is defined as money backed by private debt. McKinnon originally employs
a model with outside money (commodity money) which confines enterprises to self-
finance. Underlying this assumption is the hypothesis that money and physical capital are
complementary. Most extensions of the original neo-classical models, however, are using
an inside-money-approach, thus following Shaw [Fry, 1987, pp. 3-4].
1
3 For formal, neoclassical models see Kapur [1992] or Mathieson [1980].14




The neo-classical models of financial liberalization can be criticized for three reasons.
First, it is implicitly assumed that prior to the abolition of the interest rate ceilings, allocation
of credit was administratively decided upon. Otherwise, if firms in a competitive market en-
vironment had been free to choose their investment project, they could obtain low-cost credit
and invest into high-yield projects. Investment into low-yield projects would not be a profit-
maximizing strategy. Secondly, the mechanism of credit allocation must be assumed to im-
prove after the liberalization of interest rates. Banks are considered to screen potential loan
applicants more efficiently. If the mechanism of credit allocation remains unchanged, how-
ever, higher allocative efficiency is not an unambiguous outcome of financial liberalization.
In a more realistic scenario, a prolonged period of financial repression may have altered in-
centive mechanisms within banks [Gertler/Rose, 1993]. Consequently, banks are unable to
screen and monitor loan applicants efficiently. Thirdly, the analysis is based on the presump-
tion that higher real interest rates raise savings via the substitution effect. On empirical
grounds, however, this assumptions must be challenged as savings rates were often unaf-
fected by financial market reform. [Pagano 1993; Schiantarelli et al. 1993].
In addition, the neoclassical view of financial liberalization has been critized by neo-
structuralist, Keynesian writers. The major contribution of these authors is that they introduce
a third asset into the analysis. Households can now, apart from bank deposits and inflation
hedges, hold loans on the curb or unofficial capital market. Neo-structuralists argue that the
effect of domestic financial liberalization on economic growth depends on the substitutability15
of time deposits held in banks, on the one hand, and deposits held on curb or unorganized
money markets, on the other hand [Dornbush/Reynoso, 1989]. Curb markets enable private
savers to lend directly to enterprises or farmers. These markets are assumed to be more effi-
cient in lending than commercial banks because the former are not subject to reserve re-
quirements [Van Wijnbergen, 1983, p. 434]. As financial liberalization diverts savings to the
official banks, it leads to a reduction in the supply of loanable funds and a rising curb market
rate. This leads to a reduction in production and to rising prices, which are determined by a
mark-up over costs.
According to the neo-structuralist view, substitution is closest between curb market
and banking system deposits while in the McKinnon/Shaw framework, substitutability is
closest between (unproductive) inflation hedges and bank deposits. However, as Schiantarelli
et al. [1993] note, it is not clear why curb markets should provide more efficient financial
intermediation than formal banking systems. While informal intermediaries tend to have
closer contacts to their customers they also tend to operate in highly segmented markets.
This, however, counteracts efficiency. Another major shortcoming of the neo-structuralist
approach is that it fails to model the incentives of savers to switch their deposits away from a
more efficient form of financial intermediation towards the inefficient — because of the re-
serve requirement — commercial banking system. An explanation for this phenomenon has
been given by Kapur [1992]. The neo-structuralists, he argues, neglect the purpose for which
reserves are held. Reserves have a liquidity enhancing and a seigniorage creating function.
1
4
If these functions are incorporated into the neo-structuralist model, financial liberalization
will be welfare-improving. This analysis suggests that financial market reforms need to be
evaluated within a second-best framework. In a first-best world, mandatory reserves or other
government-imposed distortions would have no raison d'etre. However, a potential lack of
insurance markets that would protect risk-averse depositors against the sudden need to meet
some unforeseen expenses may justify a second-best-approach to be taken.
Overall, three major implications for financial market reforms in Eastern Europe
emerge from these models. First, higher real interest rates should lead to a better quality of
investment and may lead to higher savings. In addition, interest rate liberalization must be
accompanied by a reduction of reserve requirements and the abolition of directed credit pro-
grams in order to yield positive effects on investment efficiency. Secondly, the re-structuring
of household portfolios away from low-yield demand deposits and inflation hedges towards
longer-term financial assets is more likely to occur than a change in the overall size of house-
1
4 In contrast to models that treat minimum reserves as an inevitable tax and a source of
government revenue, reserves could be thought of as voluntarily held in this model.16
holds' portfolios. Thirdly, in countries where the private sector has traditionally played a cer-
tain role, such as in Poland, firms should have access to informal financial markets and to
arms-length lending. In these countries, the reform of the official financial system may be
less important at the early stages of the transformation process than in countries with an
originally small private sector, such as in former Czechoslovakia. This hypothesis is con-
firmed by the stylized facts above. While Poland put fairly little effort into reforming its fi-
nancial system at early stages of reform, the country is yet the first to report positive growth.
Incidentally, this may imply that financial markets are less important for development and
growth than theoretical analysis suggests. However, this interpretation is misleading. Curb
market finance and financing from retained earnings is inefficient to the extent markets are
segmented and that present cash flow is unrelated to future earnings perspectives. The Polish
financial system may thus still have to prove whether it can support sustained economic
growth.
On a theoretical basis, both the neo-classical as well as the neo-structuralist models of
financial liberalization fail to account for institutional features of financial markets.
Nevertheless, market imperfections such as informational asymmetries, moral hazard, and
adverse selection are considered to have substantial impact on the efficiency of financial
markets and on the way in which credit is allocated. Incidentally, these factors, which are not
explicitly taken into account by both approaches, give a theoretical rationale for the existence
of financial intermediation. Besides, the implications of financial liberalization strategies in
terms of growth prospects are restricted by the underlying production function. Traditional
neo-classical growth theory based on the Solow-model identifies an increase in the savings
rate, which leads to the accumulation of capital, as a source of short-run economic growth in
the transition to a new steady state. With constant returns to scale and no technological pro-
gress, the long-run rate of growth of per-capita income is zero. Long-run growth can thus
only be explained by exogenous increases in productivity. Hence, financial liberalization
could at best explain temporary output growth. The explanatory power of the traditional
growth models has thus been challenged by proponents of the new growth theory who con-
sider the process of capital accumulation much richer than in the concept underlying the
Solow-model. In these endogenous growth models, the growth rate of the economy is deter-




5 Endogenous growth can be modelled through constant or through increasing returns. If
the latter avenue is chosen, the existence of an equilibrium needs to be ensured by either
assuming constant returns at the firm level or by dropping the assumption of perfect
competition [Sala-i-Martin, 1990].17
2. Models with Endogenous Growth
In models with endogenous growth, it is possible to develop scenarios in which fi-
nancial intermediation can have a positive permanent impact on economic growth. These
models can be divided into three subgroups, depending on the function of banks and other fi-
nancial intermediaries that they stress. First, in Bencivenga and Smith [1991] and Levine
[1992], banks mainly provide liquidity services through the provision of payments systems
and through their holdings of diversified asset portfolios. Similarly, in Saint-Paul [1992], the
presence of financial intermediation permits the exploitation of comparative advantages by
providing the means for specialization in production. Secondly, in Roubini and Sala-i-Martin
[1992], the interaction between financial market reforms and the fiscal deficit is analyzed.
While financial market development reduces the transactions costs of converting illiquid into
liquid assets, it also reduces the leeway of the government to use a financially repressed sy-
stem as a source of government finance.
1
6 Hence, liberalization may be postponed until al-
ternative sources of government finance have been found. Thirdly, in King and Levine
[1992] as well as Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990] banks collect information and screen po-
tential loan applicants in order to divert resources to their most efficient use. As King and
Levine note, intermediaries may be able to identify promising "Schumpetarian" entrepreneurs
which would - in the absence of intermediation services -end up without access to external
finance. Bencivenga and Smith [1993], finally, analyze the implications of credit rationing on
output growth. A short summary of their work is presented below because it relates to later
parts of this paper.
Bencivenga and Smith employ a two-period, overlapping generations model. The
young generation can be divided into borrowers and lenders. Lenders sell their labor to firms
and earn a wage, they have no initial endowment of the consumption good, and value con-
sumption in both periods of their life. Borrowers, in contrast, value only consumption in pe-
riod 2, they can either sell their labor to firms or operate an investment project. Investment of
x units of the consumption good in period t yields an output of Qx units of the capital good in
period t+1 with a probability of pj, i = H, L. Two types of borrowers exist, high-risk (H)
and low-risk (L) borrowers, with their respective probabilities of success being 1 > PL > PH >
0. Instead of investing, borrowers can store period-one-income and receive an interest in-
come. It is assumed that borrowers with access to superior investment opportunities have also
access to better storing facilities. Hence, low-risk borrowers have the lower opportunity cost
of being denied credit and drop out first when lending rates are raised. Lenders cannot distin-
1
6 Giovannini/deMelo [1991] analyze the channels that run from the financial system
towards the financial situation of the government.18
guish L-type from H-type borrowers while borrowers each know their own type. Information
is thus asymmetric ex ante.
In equilibrium, lenders announce contracts (Rjt, qjt, %) with R = gross real interest
rate, q = loan quantity, and it = probability of a borrower being granted credit. Because len-
ders cannot discriminate among their customers, a self-selection mechanism is needed which
ensures that borrowers reveal their own type [Rothschild/Stiglitz, 1976, p. 632]. The self-
selection constraints require that H-type borrowers must receive a higher utility from a H-
type-contract than from an L-type contract and vice versa. If the announced contracts meet
these constraints, no lender has an incentive to diverge from his offer, contracts earn zero ex-




Credit rationing prevails in equilibrium because H-type lenders are certain to receive a
contract, while L-type lenders are not (jiLt<l). Thus, L-type borrowers are being made worse
off by the presence of H-type borrowers. Because of their lower opportunity cost of being
denied credit and their greater probability of success, L-type borrowers under perfect infor-
mation could be offered more favorable contracts in terms of price and quantity than H-type
borrowers. However, H-type borrowers would prefer L-contracts over H-contracts. If they
were certain to receive an L-contract (KLt=l), they would apply for it, and lenders would in-
cur losses (adverse selection). Hence, lenders need to specify contracts for L-type borrowers
such that these contracts are not preferred by H-type borrowers over H-type contracts. This is
captured by the self-selection constraints. For these constraints to hold, the probability of re-
ceiving an L-contract must be smaller than one.
The production function incorporates a Romer-type externality as production depends
on the firm's own capital (kt) and on labor inputs (L() as well as on the average capital stock
of the economy A:, [Romer, 1985]: Yt=k, -k? -L}~
e, 6 e (0,1). Increasing returns are external
to the individual firm which ensures the existence of a competitive equilibrium. However,
this externality also implies that the equilibrium outcome is sub-optimal. The spillover from
investment into firm-capital on the overall capital stock is not taken into account by the indi-
vidual firm. In this framework, the growth rate of the capital stock increases when credit ra-
tioning declines. Policies that reduce credit rationing thus lead to higher growth. Both, im-
provements in the overall technology (higher Q) and improvements in the technology of H-
type borrowers (higher pjj), reduce the scope for credit rationing and thus spur growth. How-
1
7 Existence of this separation equilibrium requires that no lender has an incentive to offer a
pooling contract.19
ever, if only the technology of L-type borrowers is irhproved (higher PL) the adverse selec-
tion problem is aggravated. In this case, in order to prevent H-type borrowers from applying
for L-type contracts, the probability of receiving these contracts must be reduced. The nega-
tive impact of more credit rationing may outweigh the positive impact of this technological
improvement on output.
As regards the policy implications of this model, it is hard to see how the govern-
ments in Eastern Europe could improve the technologies of only one class of borrowers. For
this government policy to be successful, governments should have superior information as
compared to commercial banks. This is an unlikely situation, if one considers the shortage of
qualified personnel that all emerging market economies face. Hence, policies that aim at re-
ducing the underlying informational asymmetry seem more promising. However, these poli-
cies are not modelled within the framework of the present endogenous growth models. Gene-
rally, the endogenous growth literature makes a substantial contribution to explaining the
links between financial intermediation and growth. It helps to answer the question whether
financial liberalization may actually spur growth or whether advanced financial markets are
merely a by-product of an overall growth process. However, the existing models tend to
make highly stylized assumptions on the nature of the process of financial intermediation and
fail to model decision processes within intermediaries. Thus, the following section looks at
the microeconomic foundations of the endogenous growth models in more detail.20
IV. A MODEL OF THE BANKING FIRM
This section introduces a microeconomic, partial-equilibrium model within which the
behavior of banks can be analyzed.
1** After analyzing the effects of non-performing loans on
the balance sheets of banks on the credit and pricing decisions of a monopolistic bank, the
basic model is extended to a framework with asymmetric information. A potential for credit
rationing for private enterprises is explained by informational advantages that state-owned
banks have with respect to state-owned firms as compared to private firms.
1. Non-Performing Loans and Costs of Insolvency
The bank is viewed as a firm which buys deposits (D) from the population and sells
loans (L) to firms. ^ In order to analyze the isolated impact of non-performing loans on the
behavior of the bank, it is assumed that the bank behaves as a risk-neutral profit maximizer
or, in other words, that it has already been privatized. This allows an analysis of bank privati-
zation and/or a hardening of banks' budget constraints in the presence of non-performing
loans. Other goals of the bank, such as the support of the economic policy of the government
and the obligation to channel directed credits to preferred sectors of the economy, are not
considered. In addition, it is assumed that banks have a reasonable long time horizon which
induces them to take balance sheet risk into account. Later, these assumptions will be relaxed.
Expected profits are thus given by:
[1.1] E[K] =
with i = 1, ..., m = number of credit contracts and j = 1, ..., n = number of deposit contracts.
All depositors and debtors, respectively, are identical such that m-Lj = L and n-D; = D. The
asset side of the bank's balance sheet consists of credits only. Liquidity reserves which are
typically held as a cushion against unforeseen withdrawals of deposits are not considered.
The balance sheet restriction thus becomes: L = D + E with E = equity capital and p = op-





8 The basic model employed in this section is based on an approach by Baltensperger/Milde
[1987], it follows the approaches by Klein [1971] and Dermine [1986] For an application
to the liberalization of financial markets in developing countries see Corsepius [1989].
1
9 In this model, the clear separability between loans and deposits is assumed. Hancock
[1991], in contrasts, uses an approach which classifies inputs and outputs based on the
calculation of the respective user costs.21
For simplicity, it will be assumed that credit risk are stochastically independent such that aL
r
= - 1/2. On deposits, the bank pays an interest rate of (iP which is smaller than the contrac-
tual rate r^ due to the fact that in the case of insolvency depositors are paid only a fraction of
the contractual interest rate
2^. All interest rates are expressed in real terms, i.e. uncertainty
over the future price level is ruled out. Operating costs (K) are increasing in D and L (Kr>
KL > 0; Kj)£), KLL > 0)
2
1 These operating costs comprise costs in connection with writing
credit contracts, with raising deposits, with maintaining customer relations, and with running
the payments system. For simplicity, the costs of gathering information on customers are as-
sumed to be part of operating costs and have no direct influence on credit returns.
2
2
The costs of insolvency (Y) occur whenever the returns from the credit business are
insufficient to cover the bank's costs, i.e. when the return on lending is less than the critical
lending rate x < %. These costs are given by
[1.2] Y = Y{D,L) = r]LoL
r j(i-t)h(T)dt
where
with T| representing the variable, proportional insolvency costs with respect to the amount of
the expected loss. Here, only the case of costly reorganization of the bank is considered; the
bank cannot go bankrupt. Whenever expenditures exceed revenues, the bank has to start
costly adjustment procedures, renegotiate with its creditors, or adjust the structure of its loan
portfolio. Alternatively, the costs of insolvency may be interpreted as managerial risk aver-
sion if it is assumed that managers' performance if evaluated based on the solvency of the
bank. If revenues fall short of costs, the costs of insolvency are borne by the equity holders
whose wealth is reduced and by the depositors who receive less than the contractual interest
rate on their deposits. The no-bankruptcy assumption implies that, in the extreme case, the
end-period value of all deposits and of the bank's equity approaches zero. Note that the bank's
equity serves as a cushion against adverse fluctuations in the value of the bank's assets. In a
2
0 This is the no-insurance case analyzed in Dermine [1986]. Dermine models the situation
with a deposit insurance and risk-adjusted insurance premia.
2
1 The bank produces loans and deposits according to a simple production function
D = D(zp and L = L(ZJ) such that the cost function K = K(D,L) = wz(D,L) can be
derived.
2
2 Later, when borrowers of different type are introduced, this assumption will be dropped.22
parallel fashion, reserve holdings as a safeguard against sudden withdrawals of deposits, i.e.
the case of illiquidity, could be modelled. The current notion, however, captures the impact
of non-performing loans on the profits of the bank through rising the probability of insol-
vency H{%).
Owing to the structure of the Eastern European banking systems, the bank is assumed
to have a a monopolistic position on both, the market for credits as well as for deposits.
2
3












Both restrictions are assumed to be binding. The monopolist bank's endogenous variables are
L, D (through which E is determined), (i^, and |iP. In order to simplify the analysis, the in-






s) are substituted for the interest rates
such that L and D remain as control variables.
Before deriving the first order conditions for the bank's profit maximum, the balance
sheet structure is explicitly introduced into the profit function by substituting D = |S-L and E
= L- P-L.
2
5 Hence, [1.1] can be rewritten as:
[1.11 E[K] = n
L(L)L-n
D(LP)-K(L,p)-Y(L,p)-p(L-pL)
The first order conditions for a profit maximum thus become:
[1.3] - 44 = ^-0+ )-n





3 This is equivalent to the assumption that the bank has a large market share with respect to
the relevant market and can influence interest rates through its pricing decision.
2
4 Note that the demand for loans depends on the interest rate r^, not on the expected
interest return of the bank.
2
5 This notion does not restrict any of the variables in the model as, as was mentioned
before, reserves as an additional asset are not considered.23
In the comparative static analysis of the model, the effects of changes in the exoge-
nous variables, i.e. the opportunity costs of holding equity, the variable operating costs, the
variable costs of insolvency, and of changes in the probability of insolvency on the en-
dogenous variables can be analyzed. Also, the impact of non-performing loans on the deci-
sions of the bank can be shown within this framework. Economic transformation raises the
amount of non-performing loans because the shift to a new set of relative prices made many
of the previous loan recipients insolvent. In other words, economic transformation and the
change in relative prices caused a decline in enterprises' net worth [Gertler/Rose, 1993]. If
banks continue to lend to these enterprises, the share of enterprises which cannot repay their
loans increases. Accordingly, the probability of the bank's insolvency rises as there is a higher




Facing a higher probability of default, the bank reduces its lending activity (scale ef-
fect) and restructures its portfolio towards holding more equity (structural effect).^ The im-
pact of a change in H(t) on D has to be measured as the combined impact of scale and
structural effects. Via the impact on credit demand and deposit supply, a rise in the probabi-
lity of insolvency raises the interest rate on credits and lowers the interest rates paid out on
deposits. Interest rate spreads are thus rising.
In this framework, a rise of H reflects the flow of non-performing loans. As H rises,
there is a greater probability of each loan to yield a return below the critical level. The
analysis of the flow problem is not an unrealistic assumption if one considers that most of the
non-performing loans currently burdening banks are the result of poor credit assessment skills
and information systems as well as of an increase in uncertainty over the future profitability
of enterprises father than a legacy from the past. However, all emerging market economies
2
6 Empirically, Shrieves and Dahl [1992] confirm this result as they find changes in capital
levels positively related to changes in asset risk. This positive relation, however, can also
be explained by managerial risk aversion. Even if the bank's owners are risk neutral, the
bank's managers may behave risk averse. This is because the managers have acquired
bank specific human capital and can thus only insufficiently diversify their risk across
many sectors as investors and equity holders could [Saunders et al., 1990]. In fact, in a
portfolio model with risk aversion do Greenwald and Stiglitz [1991] find that a rising
share of (systematic) risk induces the bank to allocate less credit. In the model presented
above, in contrast, the bank behaves as if it was risk averse due to the presence of
bankruptcy costs.24
are also facing a stock problem of non-performing loans. One interpretation of this stock
problem is that higher institutional interest rates in a situation of financial liberalization re-
duce the bank's ability to cover their interest costs out of returns from outstanding credits. In
fact, this was the reason why the Perpetual Inventory Credits which carried low nominal in-
terest rates were removed from the balance sheets of Czechoslovakian banks. In addition, the
shift in relative prices as a result of price and trade reform changed the earnings perspectives
of traditional customers and thus lead to a deterioration of the existing loan portfolios.
The stock of non-performing loans can be introduced into the model as a reduction of
the bank's equity base. Thus far, costly adjustment of the equity position of the bank had been
assumed. However, raising equity will usually be associated with adjustment costs which
may, in the short run, be prohibitively high. The implication of the bank being under-capita-
lized or~ in other words, equity-constrained is that the bank can only maintain its optimal
passive structure by reducing the supply of credit. This, again, would drive up interest rates.
Hence, there is scope for the government to intervene in order to prevent under-capitalized
banks from restricting their lending activities. This intervention could take the form of either
replacing the bank's non-performing assets by interest-bearing government bonds
2
7 or by in-
jecting new equity.
Both, a greater stock and flow of non-performing loans on the balance sheets of banks
can thus explain a reduction in aggregate lending. This finding contrasts somewhat with the
observation of "distress lending", i.e. of banks rolling over non-performing loans. This dis-
tress lending would keep overall lending at least constant or may even raise it. Distress len-
ding can be explained by two factors, both of which are not captured by the present model.
First, the bank could misperceive the negative impact that distress lending has on its own
probability of insolvency. It would thus not take the full value of H(x) into account. In a
multi-period model, this could be explained by short-sighted behavior of the bank. By rolling
over loans, the management of the bank may hope to cover losses in the short run and thus
avoid to be dismissed.
Secondly, the assumption that the bank behaves as a profit maximizer must be relaxed
if one considers the slow progress that has been made in the Eastern European reform states
with respect to the privatization of banks [Buch, 1993a]. Currently, much of the lending is
being done by state-owned banks which pursue goals other than the maximization of profits.
Many of these banks support the economic policy of the government by granting directed
credits at low interest rates to state-owned enterprises without considering the profitability of
2
7 See Schmieding and Buch [1992] for a detailed analysis.25
such loans.
2
8 Often, central banks compensate banks for losses on these loans, such that dis-
tress lending is the result of soft budget constraints of banks. If, however, the central bank
does not intervene to cover the losses on directed credits, banks will reduce lending and raise
interest rates on non-directed, regular loans.
2
9 At the same time, directed credits potentially
add to the stock of non-performing loans. If, in the long-run, the banks' budgets constraints
are hardening, the implications of the above analysis become even more severe. A higher
stock of non-performing loans would lead to an even greater reduction of real lending. In
addition, if banks have to allocate a certain proportion of their loans as directed credits, they
have fewer funds available that they can lend independently. As the following section will
show, this increases the scope for private sector credit rationing and puts upward pressure on
lending rates for non-directed credits.
This section has analyzed the problem of non-performing loans on the balance sheets
of banks in Eastern Europe under the assumption that banks' are having positive costs of in-
solvency. These costs of insolvency actually increase over the process of financial liberaliza-
tion as bankruptcy laws are becoming more strictly enforced, as disclosure rules are tight-
ened, and as better audits of banks' balance sheets are undertaken. Within the framework of
this section, it is thus possible to explain at least two of the stylized facts of the financial
markets in the emerging market economies. First, profit maximizing banks which balance
sheets are burdened with non-performing loans tend to reduce their lending activities. Len-
ding will be reduced to a greater extent the higher insolvency costs are. This mechanism is
most evident in Hungary, where insolvency costs were raised through the implementation of
a bankruptcy law. Conversely, if real lending increases as was the case in Poland in 1991-92
despite a substantial non-performing loans problem, this gives evidence that banks do not be-
have as profit maximizers and do not weigh insolvency costs heavily. Secondly, the high real
lending rates that were observed in all three countries can be explained by the presence of
non-performing loans. In former Czechoslovakia where the stock of non-performing loans
was reduced first, real interest rates were lowest, which is in line with the results of the above
analysis.
In summary, two major policy implications emerge. First, the stock problem of non-
performing loans should be tackled by recapitalizing the banks with interest-bearing govern-
ment bonds. Secondly, when addressing the flow of non-performing loans, two cases have to
2
8 In Russia, for example, about 50 percent of all bank loans were granted as directed credits
in 1992. In 1993, this share was in the order of'30-40 percent.
2
9 There is in fact anecdotal evidence from Russia that banks which are being envolved in
directed credit programs are cautious in lending out their own funds.26
be distinguished. Either banks have already been privatized and operate as profit maximizers.
In this situation, a reduction in lending will be a rational strategy which can only be avoided
by improving the credit assessment skills of the bankers and the information systems of the
bank. This issue is taken up in section 2.3.30 Alternatively, banks may yet be state-owned,
operate under soft budget constraints, and thus disregard insolvency costs. In this situation,
they may use the additional leeway that a recapitalization program would provide to continue
lending to non-profitable enterprises. They may expect to be bailed out by the government if
they engage in this moral hazard behavior. This necessitates the introduction of safeguards
against unsound lending such as ceilings on credits from state-owned banks to state-owned
enterprises. In addition, the recapitalization of banks should be closely tied to the privatiza-
tion of banks in order to prevent a re-occurrence of the problem of non-performing loans.
2. Incomplete Information
The previous section has shown that a higher share of non-performing loans on the
balance sheets of banks may cause a decrease in overall lending and higher interest rates.
This result warrants two modifications. First, the reduction of lending may not be spread uni-
formly across enterprises. Instead, the allocation of credit depends on the quality of informa-
tion that banks have. Generally, the transition from plan to market led to a sharp increase in
informational asymmetries. While the existing state-owned banks tend to have close, well-
established business relationships with state-owned enterprises, new, private enterprises have
less well-established relations with banks and can offer less reliable records of past perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, it may be argued that private enterprises will be more profitable in the
long-run as compared to the existing firms. Hence, in a situation with perfect information, the




Secondly, this section will show that in the presence of incomplete information, banks
may prefer not to raise interest rates but to restrict lending instead in order to avoid a deterio-
ration of the quality of loans applicants. This result will be derived under the assumption that
banks are profit-maximizers. Many banks in Eastern Europe pursue other goals. Most impor-
tantly, as was mentioned above, state-owned banks are often agents of the government and
channel indirect subsidies in the form of directed credit towards ailing, state-owned firms.
However, this interdependence between the government's economic policy and the banking
3
0 Macroeconomic stabilization which has yet to be achieved in most successor states of the
Soviet Union would, in addition, remove basic uncertainties.
3
1 See Part II.2 on the empirical evidence for credit rationing in Eastern Europe.27
system would only aggravate the findings below. If banks channel cheap credit to state-
owned enterprises, credit to private firms - at a given level of total loans - would be rationed
to a greater extent than in the benchmark case of profit-maximizing banks. In addition, state-
owned banks may disregard the negative impact that higher interest rates may have on the
quality of the pool of loans applicants. This would give a further explanation for the observa-
tion that high real interest rates coincide with a high share of non-performing loans.
Generally, models with asymmetric information can be divided into two broad
groups. If information is asymmetric ex ante, lenders are concerned with selecting the right
borrower from a group of seemingly identical customers. Despite their appearing similarity,
customers may differ in their honesty, ability, willingness to put effort into a project, or with
respect to the riskiness of their projects [Clemenz/Ritthaler, 1992, p. 14.]. Hence, banks may
end up with a suboptimal pool of customers (adverse selection). Another form of informa-
tional asymmetry occurs ex post, i.e. after finance has been granted. While all borrowers may
be identical when receiving finance or while the bank may be able to identify borrowers of
different type, the bank may not be able to costlessly observe the outcome. If this is the case,
borrowers have an incentive to falsely state the true project outcome, and to retain some of
the return for themselves. Also, the actually realized return may depend on the effort that the
manager assigns to running the project which, again, the bank may not be able to observe.
Hence, in this principal-agent framework, banks assign funds to monitor the firm.
The main focus of the models presented next will be ex ante informational asymme-
tries which result in adverse selection. In addition, the analysis will focus on the analysis of
debt contracts. The issuance of equity gives rise to problems which primarily stem from ex
post asymmetric information. If the preferences of the owners of a firm and of the managers
do not coincide, the question arises of how to influence the manager's behavior such that he
acts in the interest of the owners. One way or another, owners have to monitor the actions of
the manager. Hence, if monitoring is costly and if bankruptcy costs are non-negative for the
manager, a fixed-rate debt contract may be the optimal solution [Goodhart, 1989, p. 168].28
2.1. The Stiglitz-Weiss Framework
The rationale behind models with ex ante asymmetric information that result in ad-
verse selection is given by the seminal paper of Stiglitz and Weiss [1981].
3
2 They define
credit rationing as a situation where, in equilibrium:
"(a) among loan applicants who appear to be identical some receive a loan and others do not, and the
rejected applicants would not receive a loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; or (b)
there are identifiable groups of individuals in the population who, with a given supply of credit, are
unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even though with a larger supply of credit, they would"
[Stiglitz/Weiss, 1981, p. 394-395].
3
3
In the original model of Stiglitz and Weiss, the bank knows only the expected returns
of enterprises but cannot differentiate between borrowers with different risk characteristics.
Expected returns are assumed to be identical for all borrowers (mean preserving spreads).
Borrowers, in contrast, know the probability distribution of project returns. Adverse selection
stems from the fact that the average profit of a firm from a loan project increases with the
riskiness of the project while the expected profit to the bank decreases. This is because the
debtor has only limited liability in the case of failure and because — in the case of success —
the bank does receive a fixed return regardless of the profitability of the project.
3
4 It can be
shown that for each borrower there is a certain threshold level of risk beyond which his ex-
pected profit from borrowing becomes negative. The higher the interest rate, the higher is this
threshold level of riskiness, such that at high levels of interest only high risk borrowers re-
main in the market. As the bank raises the rate of interest charged on loans, the average ex-
pected profit on the remaining customers rises but, at the same time, low-risk borrowers re-
treat from the market. This adverse selection effect lowers the bank's profits. In addition,
there may be a moral hazard effect as the remaining customers tend to choose risky projects.
Hence, there exists a level of interest rates at which the bank maximizes profits and which
3
2 De Meza and Webb [1992] show that credit may also be rationed in a situation of
symmetric information. Their result is due to the fact that borrowers are not concerned
with the loss in the case of bankruptcy while creditors recover some positive amount in
this situation. Hence, creditors set their required interest rate below the one the borrower
would pay.
3
3 This is identical to the so-called type II credit rationing under which the loan quantity at
fixed loan size, not the loan size is rationed [Allen, 1987, p. 2]. See also Cosci [1993,
pp.7].
3
4 For the purpose of this argument it is assumed that firms cannot offer collateral to the
banks which would suffice to cover any expected losses. Equivalently, cross-subsidization
of investment projects between different branches of a specific enterprise is ruled out.29
lies below the market-clearing interest rate level. The market for loans with such a backward-
bending supply curve is depicted by graph 3.
Graph 3 — Equilibrium Credit Rationing
Supply
Bank's Profits L*
Banks maximize profits at r*L and at the corresponding amount of credits L*. At this
rate of interest, borrowers demand credit at the amount of L
D(/•*), they are thus rationed by
the amount A = Z,
D(/"*)-Z,\ The reason for this rationing is that the bank optimal lending
rate has put an upper ceiling on the deposit rate.
3
5
Stiglitz and Weiss then argue that there may be situations in which groups of obser-
vationally different borrowers exist and in which some of these groups may be systematically
excluded from the credit market (red-lining or type-b rationing) [Stiglitz/Weiss, 1981, p. 406-
407; 1987]. As mentioned above, banks in Eastern Europe can clearly separate private and
state-owned enterprises but may have different sets of information with respect to each
group. Assume in addition that the average return to the bank from lending to state-owned
enterprises is greater than the return from lending to private enterprises. If the bank has costs
3
5 The volume of deposits that the bank can raise at this rate may, however, lie below the
demand for funds [Clemenz/Ritthaler, 1992, p. 14].30
of funds that lie just in an intermediate range, private enterprise will be completely credit ra-
tioned while at least some state enterprises will receive a loan. This is, because in equilibrium
expected returns from lending to state-owned and private enterprises must be equal (and
equal to the costs of loanable funds to the bank).
There are three possible explanations why the average return to the bank from lending
to private enterprises may be smaller than that from lending to state enterprises. First, private
investment may be more risky than state enterprises' investment. In this case, the overall re-
turn (bank's plus firm's profits) from investment into private activity may be greater than the
overall return from state enterprise investment. However, for bank profits alone, the opposite
holds. Secondly, private investors may have access to a broader range of projects, including
high-risk projects, than state enterprises do. Because firm profits increase with the riskiness
of the project, private borrowers will tend to choose these risky projects. Again, the bank's
profits would be adversely affected. Thirdly, evaluation of private investment may be more
difficult than evaluation of state enterprise investment. Hence, the bank may observe only a
fraction of the return to private enterprises.
While it is not obvious a priori that private investment per se is more risky than in-
vestment by state-owned enterprises, the latter two explanations capture features of financial
markets in Eastern Europe. New, private enterprises can start their operations in a number of
new areas jvhile state-owned enterprises tend to keep on operating in their inherited field of
experience. Thus, a broader range of investment opportunities that private investors face can
be a result of both, their greater flexibility and their ability to start operations anew. In addi-
tion, the existing state-owned banks tend to have close business relations with the state-
owned enterprises which reduces informational asymmetries and eases project evaluation.
Interlocking ownership between state-owned banks and enterprises may add to this. Accor-
dingly, informational asymmetries are less severe for the existing, state-owned banks when
dealing with these enterprises rather then with new, private firms.
In the original model by Stiglitz and Weiss, asymmetric information may result in un-
derinvestment [Hillier/Ibrahimo, 1993, p. 288] because some potentially profitable firms do
not receive external finance.
3
6 Thus, the assumption may be relaxed that overcoming the in-
formational asymmetry is prohibitively costly. There may in fact exist market mechanisms
that would serve to reduce this asymmetry. So far, banks only had one instrument - the in-
3
6 DeMeza and Webb [1987], in contrast, show that asymmetric information can also lead to
overinvestment. This is the case when both projects have the same return in case of
success but different probabilities of being successful.31
terest rate - to control for two variables - risk and return. If banks are given more instru-
ments, they can offer separating contracts for different classes of borrowers and obtain their
preferred risk-return-combination in a no-rationing-equilibrium. This situation is analyzed
next.
2.2. Sorting Equilibrium
The provision of collateral as a sorting device has been proposed as one mechanisms
that serves to mitigate the adverse effects of informational asymmetries
3
7 [Bester, 1985]. To
the extent that investors with inside information are willing to commit their own wealth to an
investment project do banks receive a signal on the creditworthiness of the customers. As
low-risk borrowers accept high collateral requirements, they distinguish themselves from
high-risk borrowers. This result is derived under the assumption of perfect competition.
Hellwig [1988], in contrast, analyzes the behavior of a monopolistic bank under ex ante
asymmetric information.
3** Under certain parameter constellations, self-selection mechanisms
are insufficient to prevent credit rationing to occur, and the bank's profit maximum may be
reached only if credit is rationed.
3
9
The Hellwig-model is specified as follows. In a monopolistic market, one bank serves
many potential investors of type a. Each investor can invest an exogenously given amount I
in order to receive a gross return of X". Hence, the fixed-size investment case is analyzed.
There are two types of investment project t = 1, 2 and each entrepreneur can choose only one
project with
3
7 In this paper, multi-period models are not considered. In Sharpe [1990] as well as
Besanko and Thakor [1992], for example, repeated games are developed which allow the
impact of reputational concerns on the behavior of borrowers. In these multi-period
models, borrowers will tend to reveal their own type and will not behave against the
interest of lenders. This will happen to the extent that borrowers benefit from the
maintenance of longer-term business relationships.
3
8 Bester and Hellwig [1987] use a model in which ex ante asymmetric information leads to
moral hazard because a given firm has the choice between two different projects which
differ according to their riskiness. They show that a monopolistic bank may ration credit
only if the collateral that firms can offer is insufficient. However, in the context of this
analysis, the focus will be on adverse selection.
3
9 Baltensperger and Milde [1987] show that self-selection can also be ensured through
variations of the loan size. The effect is similar to that of pledging collateral, with a
smaller loan size corresponding to more collateral. However, if the equity endowment of
enterprises is fixed, varying loan sizes do not eliminate the scope for underinvestment.32











i.e. project 2 is less risky because it has a higher probability of success (p), while project 1
has a greater return in the case of success, but project 2 yields the higher expected return.
4
0 It
is assumed that the return on project 2 exceeds the bank's cost of funds. Hence, the bank has
always a preference for financing project 2. The bank does not know whether an investor
applying for a loan has access to an investment project of type 1 or 2. However, the bank
knows thata share of q of the total population are type 1 investors and, accordingly, a share
(1- q) are of type 2. In addition, the bank can observe whether a firm was successful but it
cannot observe the actual return. In order to keep the analysis simple, we will at first abstract
from the existence of a class of enterprises such as existing state-owned enterprises on which
the bank has perfect information. As will be shown later, this would not change the qualita-
tive nature of the results.
Each investor has an initial endowment of W which he partially uses to equity finance
(ES) his project (W > ES). However, his equity share is insufficient to finance the whole in-
vestment such that a bank loan L = I - ES is needed. As an alternative to investing into the
(risky) project, the firm can invest its initial endowment into bank deposits or into riskless
bonds. The return on bank deposits is riskless as well because the bank can diversify its risks
across many projects. It can be shown that the bank has an incentive to set its deposit rate r^
just equal to the risk-free rate and, by assumption, receive all the firm's excess funds plus
household deposits (D) at this rate. Firms are risk averse and have identical strictly monotone
and concave utility functions.
4
1 A firm's utility when not receiving a loan is therefore:
[2.3] V* = u(r
D-W)
If the firm receives a loan, utility is given by
[2.4]
4
0 The assumption of mean preserving spreads as in the Stiglitz/Weiss-model has therefore
been dropped. Instead, first order stochastic dominance is assumed.
4
1 This is similar to assuming risk neutral borrowers with positive bankruptcy costs.33
where C = collateral and R = (1 + r
L) L. In the case of success, the firm receives interest
payments on its bank deposit plus the project return and has to pay interest. In the case of
failure, it receives interest payments but has to pay the collateral to the bank. The larger the
probability of failure, the more disutility does a firm receive from the collateral requirement.
The bank offers contracts (Rj, Cj) and (R2, C2) to firms and, in addition, determines
probabilities %\, 712 which indicate the willingness of the bank to grant loans to the firms.
This set-up resembles a three-stage game. In the first stage, the bank offers the contract.
Then, firms select their preferred contract and, in the third stage, the bank may reject appli-
cants [Hell wig, 1987, p. 320]. The bank maximizes its average profit per transaction by
choosing the optimal debt contract [(R]*, C\*), (R2*. C2*), 7q*, Ji2*]- Average profits are
given by
[2.5] P = 9-7tl£[n(A;
with the expected profits
When determining the optimal debt contract, the bank must meet the following restrictions:
— It must be individually rational for a firm to accept a loan contract, i.e. its expected
utility from investing into bank deposits must be smaller than the one from investing
into a risky project: Vt* (Rt, Ct) > VQ*. This means that a firm is not credit rationed if
it is just indifferent between investing into bank deposits or the risky project.
— Contracts must be incentive compatible, i.e. firm 1 will accept contract (R\, C\) only
if it receives a greater increase in utility (as compared to the no-investment case) than




— Firm value must not become negative: r
D W+ Xl>Rl>0 A r
D W>Ct>0 V t.
— The credit contract must be feasible: W + D > [q• 71, + (1 - q)• K2]
— Probabilities may not become negative: 1 > 7it > 0.
4
2 This restriction is similar to the self-selection constraint in the model by Bencivenga and
Smith.34
The marginal rates of substitution between interest rates and collateral requirements
are such that the bank would always prefer higher interest rates and collateral while for the
firm, obviously, the opposite holds true. However, if C > 0 and R < Xt, the firm would accept
a rise in the interest rate if it were compensated by a lower collateral requirement. This would
shift part of the project risk from the firm to the bank. In other words, due to its risk aversion,
the firm would be willing to pay a premium for being able to shift some of the project risk to
the bank. Under complete information, there would be no need for the risk-shifting function
of collateral. The bank would offer contracts (X\, 0) and (X2, 0) to type-1 and type-2 firms,
respectively, and take all the risk off the firms. If funds were scarce, the bank would first
grant credit to all type-2 firms and only allocate the remainder to type-1 firms. Under asym-
metric information, the bank can no more assign a certain contract to a specific firm. If it did
not demand any collateral and set interest rates equal to expected returns, type-1 borrowers
would have an incentive to apply for type-2 contracts. Accordingly, the bank uses the col-
lateral requirement and the probability of acceptance to sort between the two groups of bor-
rowers. It makes use of the fact that cet. par. type-2 firms would accept a higher collateral
requirement than type-1 firms because the former have a lower probability of reaching the
bad state of the world.
4
3
The interdependence of interest rates and collateral requirements is shown in graph 4.
l\ and I2 depict the indifference curves where type-1 and type-2 firms are just indifferent
between investing into the risky project and depositing their wealth in a bank account. Rai-
sing the interest rate by moving from area A to area B would reduce the number of type-2
borrowers. Because of firm 2's lower probability of default, it has a lower marginal rate of
substitution between interest rates and collateral requirements.
4
4 The optimal debt contract
offered by the bank has to satisfy the following conditions: If type-1 firms have a positive
probability of receiving credit (jq* > 0), they face no collateral requirement (C\* = 0) and a
non-negative interest rate (R^* > 0). If type-2 firms have a positive probability of receiving
credit (712* > 0), the condition for individual rationality for type-2 firm and the incentive
4
3 At this stage, a comparison of the present model with the approach of Stiglitz and Weiss
is in order. The latter assume that both, bank and firm, are risk neutral but that the returns
of the bank (firm) decrease (increase) with the riskiness of the project chosen. In the
Hellwig-model, firms are risk-averse, and the bank is risk-neutral. What is essential for
the credit rationing result to obtain is thus not the exact specification of the individual
attitudes towards risk but the fact that under certain parameter constellations, borrowers
may pursue goals different from those of the lenders.
AA T-U 1 c L. • • • u j^no dC 1 - V, ll\r°W ~ C)
4
4 The marginal rate of substitution is given by MRS = = — ^ —.
dR, pt u'^35
compatibility condition for type-1 firm bind, the collateral requirement is positive (C2* > 0),
and the interest rate is below the project return (R2* < X2). In other words, the bank has an
incentive to sort customers apart. Starting from point (X2, 0), the bank can lower R2 and
raise C2 while keeping the allocation of risk and its own profits constant. At the same time,
this change of contractual terms allows the bank to raise R\ and to receive higher profits.
When making these adjustments, the bank has to make sure that type-1 firms are just indif-
ferent between type-1 and type-2 contracts. Hence, (R\,C2) and (i?,,0)is one potential out-
come. As an alternative to lowering R2 and raising C2, the bank could lower the probability
with which type-2 firms receive credits [Graph 4].
4
5



























5 Note that the graph has been drawn under the assumption TC2
 =
 Kl- Lowering 712 would
not constitute a case of credit rationing because type-2 firms are just indifferent in
equilibrium whether they receive a loan. The fact that R* <Xr and K\ < 1 is a possible
outcome distinguishes the present model from the perfect competition case presented in
Bester [1985]. Under perfect competition, any competing bank could offer a slightly
higher rate Rf+e and attract the formerly rejected firms. As the bank could make
positive profits, the initial situation cannot have been an equilibrium [Bester, 1985,
p. 853]. The final equilibrium is thus the intersection of the two indifference curves Ij and36
In order to determine the optimal profit maximizing strategy of the bank, it is as-
sumed that
[2.6] p2X2 > r
d-I,
i.e. the returns to project 2 exceed the bank's costs of funds. In the perfect information case,
this would imply that the bank requires no collateral and sets R2* = X2. If the bank has only
insufficient funds to finance all investment projects, it sets K2 = m\n[\,W+D/l]. Under im-
perfect information, the bank can only come close to this result if the share of high-risk bor-
rowers q is sufficiently small. When analyzing the characteristics of possible equilibria,
Hellwig distinguishes situations which differ depending on the size of q, the sufficiency of
bank'sTunds, and the profitability of type-1 investment. Here, we treat the case of sufficient
funds (W+D > I) and small q. Provided that projects of type 1 are in principle profitable, the
bank sets the interest rate for type-1 borrowers above the maximum obtainable return for
type-2 borrowers and the probability of receiving credit equal to one. There is no rationing.
Rationing may occur if type-1 projects are in principle unprofitable. Then, under perfect in-
formation, the bank would set n\ = 0. With a positive probability of type-2 firms to receive
credit, however, this policy is suboptimal under incomplete information. Hence, in order to
ensure incentive compatibility, the bank must assign a positive probability to type-1 firms
obtaining credit (jq*(q) < 1 and Rj* = X2). As all type 1-firms would like to receive credits
but only receive a loan with a probability of less than one, equilibrium credit rationing oc-
curs.
Thus, there remains some scope for credit rationing even if collateral requirements are
introduced. The reason why credit rationing occurs is that the costs for the bank of sorting
enterprises apart by means of collateral and interest rate requirements may at some point
outweigh the benefits from sorting. If q is small, the risk that a collateral requirement im-
poses on type-2 enterprises causes a fairly high costs as compared to the costs savings of not
having to subsidize type-1 borrowers. Hence, under perfect competition, a pooling contract
would be optimal if q is sufficiently small [Hellwig, 1987].
4
6
These baseline results do not change qualitatively if state-owned firms, on which the
bank has perfect information, are introduced. Assume that these enterprises have investment
opportunities which are identical to those of private firms and that population shares are
identical as well. As the bank can sort type-1 and type-2 state-owned firms apart, it sets
In this case, nx < 1 would not be feasible.37
R? = X} and #f = X2, Cf = C2 = 0, and rcf = 7cf = 1. The bank's overall profits from doing




While profits from business with private firms are
Because 7r£ = l and p^+(l-p2)C2
P = p2X2, [2.7] and [2.8] differ to the extent that
Jif < 1 and Rf < Xr In other words, the bank is indifferent between granting loans to type-2
state-owned or private enterprises while it prefers type-1 state-owned to private firms. Pro-
vided that loanable funds are sufficient and that all projects are in principle profitable, the
presence of state-owned firms will not affect the extent to which private firms are credit ra-
tioned. However, if funds are scarce, the bank first finances all type-2 firms, then type-1
state-owned enterprises, and allocates only the remainder to type-1 private firms. This does
not change the qualitative nature of the results but aggravates credit rationing of type-1 pri-
vate firms.
The level of initial net worth thus determines whether a no-rationing, separating equi-
librium is obtained. Calomiris and Hubbard [1990] take explicit account of the fact that bor-
rowers exist which differ with respect to asymmetric information, expected return from in-
vestment, and their internal net worth. The level of internal net worth determines how much
collateral a firm can pledge. Five types of borrowers exist, while lenders can only differenti-
























Expected returns are given by
RL>R2>Rs>Ru>0
R2>Rs>[pRL+(l-p)Ru] <=> R2>RS>R]'
Calomiris and Hubbard show that for each class of observationally different asymmetric in-
formation borrowers (i = H, L) a critical level of internal net worth Q* exists above which
sorting occurs. If for both groups of these borrowers this level of internal net worth is not
reached, a pooling contract is offered and leads to rationing. In this case, lending to symme-
tric information borrowers is most profitable due to the intermediate return that lenders can
earn from this group. If internal net worth is sufficiently large only in the H-group, type-2
borrowers in this group are financed first. By means of collateral requirements, these bor-
rowers can be sorted apart. Rationing is limited to low net-worth type-1 borrowers. Finally, if
internal net worth exceeds the critical level Cj* for both asymmetric information groups, a
perfect information (separating) equilibrium is replicated.
The above considerations are relevant for the situation of Eastern Europe because a
lack of collateral is one of the major obstacles to functioning financial markets. This is the re-
sult of both, an unclear legal framework regarding the provision of collateral as well as of un-
resolved ownership issues and limited access to collaterizable assets. Incidentally, new, pri-
vate enterprises are hit hardest by the resulting "collateral gap" [Schmieding, 1991]. In this
situation, a sorting equilibrium may not exist. Ex ante screening of borrowers is thus re-
quired. This can be achieved through banks' investment into screening loan applicants. As a
matter of fact, screening and sorting are substitute technologies [Devinney, 1986]. While un-
der sorting through collateral, the borrower pays the cost of overcoming informational
asymmetries, under screening the bank does.
Note that the above argument does not apply to the recently privatized enterprises.
These private firms tend to have maintained their relationships with the existing banks.
Hence, they have no informational disadvantage as compared to state-owned enterprises. At
the same time, privatized firms may have easier access to collateral through foreign partner-
ships. In addition, banks may take the successful privatization of such firms as a signal for
future profitability. These factors should give privatized firms a particular advantage over
new private firms in obtaining finance.39
2.3. Investment into Information
47
Under the assumption that collateral is insufficient but that the acquisition of infor-
mation causes finite costs, banks' investment into information on potential borrowers allows
banks to sort out and correctly identify loan applicants. Investment into information takes
place until the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits of identification. Here, the costs are
determined by the personnel and the technical equipment that need to be employed for credit
assessment, the benefits derive from the possibility to renounce from using (costly) sorting
devices and to be able to tailor-make loan contracts. At the bank's optimum level of invest-
ment into information, three scenarios regarding remaining uncertainties are thus possible.
First, less than the actually existing different groups of borrowers are identified. Secondly,
only a fraction of all customers is being classified. Thirdly, customers are not classified cor-
rectly. Here, the second case is considered. The bank knows how many groups of customers
exist but chooses not to classify all customers. With m loan applicants, the expected return
from an investment project is given by:
4
8
[3.1] E[pX]° =mp~X = m(l-q)p2X2+q-prX1





Now, the bank can invest into information which leads to the correct classification of
0 < A. < 1 customers. This investment does not affect the expected return from investment but









7 This section follows Baltensperger and Milde pp. 169.
4
8 The assumptions on risk, return, and population shares are identical to those of the
Hellwig-model with private firms only.40
In order to produce information, z units of an input factor must be employed at a cost of w.
Through the production of information, the share of correctly classified customers X in-
creases, which has a negative impact on the variability of project returns:




This makes the critical rate of return (t) a function of the standard deviation and of the in-
formation activity. The expected profit of the bank from each transaction can thus be written
as
[3.4] E[P] = [H + C + 6(Z)-T]] — -C7(z)- f(T-T)/(T)-
where i = opportunity cost in investment into loans for the bank (interest rate on government
bonds). In equilibrium, the bank chooses the optimal level of investment into information z*






In the first equation, the LHS gives the marginal benefits of investment into information, the
RHS the marginal costs. Hence, the less input units need to be invested for reducing the stan-
dard deviation of project returns (az large), the greater will be the level of investment into in-
formation.
Investment activities of banks can actually explain the existence of financial interme-
diation endogenously. Financial intermediaries reduce transaction costs which arise from ex
ante asymmetric information.
4
9 Cost-savings effects from diversification enable interme-
diaries to collect and process information at a lower cost than individual market participants
could. There are a number of channels through which investment into information can be
facilitated:
4
9 Williamson [1987] applies this to the case of ex post asymmetric information.41
Banks must be given incentives for investing into information. This requires that interest
rates can be set independently, and that other non-interest terms can be determined by the
bank. While former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have made substantial progress
in this regard, many states, especially some successor states of the Soviet Union, lag be-
hind. Here, interest rates remain at low or even negative levels and can thus not provide a
fair return for investment into information.
Banks often use their deposit base as a source of information on loan customers. Banks
learn about the financial situation of a client by observing the development of his depo-
sits. Hereby, they exploit economies of scope between the deposit and the lending busi-
ness. To the extent that in Eastern Europe deposits tend to be concentrated in the large
savings banks, this potential source of information remains unutilized. Hence, in order to
enlarge and better use the information capital of the banking systems, the lending activi-
ties of the savings banks should be promoted.
Credit assessment procedures must be formalized. In many Eastern European banks there
are no standardized form sheets or procedures that have to be followed when setting up a
loan proposal. Accordingly, there are high costs associated with every single contract, and
different loan applications cannot easily be compared. An upgrading of credit assessment
procedures also requires a mandatory risk analysis to be done. More formalized accoun-
ting procedures will support these activities.
The credit assessment skills of the existing staff must be trained. Eastern European banks
have to rely on local personal, and there is large scope for Western banks and other
institutions to provide for a transfer of know-how.42
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In contrast to the macroeconomic- approaches to financial liberalization, mi-
croeconomic models of the banking firm explicitly capture relevant features of the financial
markets in transition. These latter models imply that the effects of interest rate liberalization
and other liberalization measures on the efficiency of resource allocation depend upon the
degree of market imperfections in the Eastern European banking systems. It was first shown
that, in the presence of positive costs of insolvency, non-performing loans on the balance
sheets of banks can lead to higher lending rates and a reduction of loan supply.
The analysis makes a strong case for solving both, the stock and the flow problem of
bad debt. A high stock of bad debt reduces the bank's equity position and leaves it under-
capitalized. In order to maintain its optimal balance sheet structure and to avoid insolvency
costs, the bank would thus have to substantially scale down its lending activities. This ad-
verse effect can be avoided by recapitalizing banks. However, it has also been shown that a
decline in the profitability of new loans (flow problem) would lead to a reduction in overall
lending. In private banks, this is the result of a lack of information and of an increase in in-
vestment risk. In this case, the reduction of lending can be made less severe by improving the
information systems and the credit assessment skills of bankers. If banks are state-owned and
participate in directed credit programs, the flow of non-performing loans may actually in-
crease as a result of a recapitalization program. This is because such a program gives banks
additional leeway for lending and makes future bail-outs more likely. Hence, the paper iden-
tified the privatization of banks as means to cope with the flow problem of non-performing
loans. To the extent that the privatization cannot be accomplished over night, safeguards in
the form of ceilings on lending from state banks to state enterprises may be introduced. In
addition, directed credit programs and other state intervention in credit allocation should be
abolished in order to free resources for the private sector.
At some stage, banks may prefer not to raise interest rates as a response to an increase
of non-performing loans but to ration credit instead. This is the case if information is
asymmetrically distributed and if sorting devices do not exist. In this situation, higher interest
rates adversely affect the pool of loan applicants. To the extent that information on private
enterprises is more costly to the existing banks than information on state-owned enterprises,
the private sector is more likely to be credit rationed. Policies should aim at the improvement
of information systems by adjusting the legal and the accounting systems to Western
standards, by training bankers, establishing public information systems on creditors, and by
improving the technical equipment of banks. In addition, private sector's access to collateral43
as a sorting device should be eased by allowing private ownership and by quickly solving
restitution issues.
Close ties between existing state-owned banks and enterprises are one cause for the
good access that banks have to information on these firms. Privatized banks with hard budget
constraints may actually use this information capital and contribute to a more efficient allo-
cation or resources. This gives an additional argument for the quick privatization of banks.
Also, a higher market shares of new banks would reduce the scope for private sector credit
rationing. New market entrants may have more equal costs of acquiring information on pri-
vate and on state-owned enterprises. They will thus bias their lending to a lesser extent
against private enterprises than state-owned banks do.
The findings of this paper are confirmed by the available empirical observations al-
though certainly more detailed, micro-economic evidence is required. Generally, high real in-
terest rates and the reduction of the real credit that could be observed in Eastern Europe can
be explained by the presence of non-performing loans on the balance sheets of banks.
However, when adjusting real lending rates upwards, banks may not have taken due account
of adverse selection effects. The different timing of the reduction in real credit can, apart
from macroeconomic factors, be explained by incentives of banks to take balance sheet risk
into account. Former Czechoslovakia was the first country to deal with the stock problem of
bad debt on the balance sheets of banks. This, first of all, reduced the undercapitalization of
banks. At the same time, this recapitalization seems to have sent a signal to banks to contain
the flow problem and to restrict lending to ailing state-owned firms. Hence, the decline of
real credit was least severe in former Czechoslovakia, credit to the private sector expanded
more rapidly than in the other two countries, and real interest rates were lower on average. In
Hungary, the enforcement of bankruptcy laws since 1992 has similarly induced banks to be
more cautious about their lending activities. In Poland, in contrast, real credit expanded in
1991 and 1992 despite the high share of non-performing loans on the balance sheets of com-
mercial banks. This indicates that Polish banks have not been subjected to hard budget
constraints and were not given proper incentives to consider balance sheet risk.44
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